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Conceptual divergence, functionalism and the economics of convergence 
 







It is common knowledge amongst legal academics and practitioners that legal systems 
sometimes diverge. Over the years, law and economics scholarship has paid attention 
to that phenomenon, under the heading of “law and economics of comparative law” or 
“regulatory  competition”.  That  scholarship  often  assumes  that  convergence  or 
divergence between legal systems is easily perceptible, i.e. that it can be seen in the 
face of the formal sources of law. For example, the applicable legislation of legal 
system A states that “title to the goods sold passes to the buyer upon the conclusion of 
a valid contract”, whereas the applicable legislation in system B states that “title to the 
goods sold passes to the buyer upon delivery of the goods to the buyer”. Divergence is 
explicit  and  open.  Economic  actors  can  be  expected  to  behave  accordingly.  As  a 
consequence, the literature considers that, through their conduct, economic actors will 
also influence the evolution of legal systems in order to reach an efficient outcome as 
regards  the  appropriate  level  of  convergence  or  divergence.  If  needed,  legislative 
action  (ranging  from  mild  coordination  to  outright  unification)  can  also  address 
explicit divergence. 
 
This  paper  aims  to  take  a  broader  perspective  on  issues  of  convergence  and 
divergence between legal systems. 
 
First of all, it takes a more complex view of convergence by relaxing the assumption 
that language is unequivocal: the same words can mean different things to different 
people, what we will call “conceptual divergence”. In the case of explicit divergence 
mentioned  in  the  previous  paragraph,  divergence  literally  springs  to  the  eye,  and 
actually in a number of cases it reflects a deliberate choice to diverge.
1 In contrast, 
“conceptual  divergence” often  lurks  below  the  surface  and  is  neither  immediately 
perceptible nor entirely deliberate. 
 
For the purposes of this contribution, the working definition of conceptual divergence 
put forward by Bert van Roermund
2 will be used: 
 
A  legal term  T is conceptually  divergent  between agents  A and  B,  if T is 
common parlance between A and B, and if the sense and/or the reference of T 
yields meaning M1 for A and M2 for B, such that A and B can use M1 and M2 
to argue differing courses of action as lawful (or unlawful) under the legal order 
they are both committed to. 
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1  Between  different  legal  orders  or  within  a  single  order  which  allows  this  practice  under  certain 
circumstances, like a federation. 
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In a case of explicit divergence, there is no doubt in the minds of the agents that there 
is divergence, whereas in the case of conceptual divergence, it can be that the agents 
believe that they are indeed using the same concept, since they label it with the same 
term, while they are in fact using diverging concepts. We will come back to this point 
during  this  paper:  sometimes  the  standard  analysis  must  be  adapted  to  deal  with 
conceptual divergence, but very often it makes no difference whether the divergence 
is explicit or conceptual. 
 
Secondly,  this  paper  also  takes  into  account  a  broader  range  of  dynamic  tools  to 
address convergence and divergence. As mentioned in the outset, the literature so far 
(perhaps  reflecting  a  private  law  bent)  tends  to  rely  primarily  on  the  choice  of 
economic actors as regards the law governing, or applicable to, their legal relationship 
as a tool to reach an efficient outcome. Whilst this tool is undeniably available and 
effective,  it  is  also  limited:  economic  actors  cannot  influence  the  law  at  will  and 
moreover legal issues are often peripheral in the choices made by economic actors. In 
this paper, we want to suggest that there is also – or ought to be – a “marketplace of 
legal  ideas”,  i.e.  a  market-like  process  where  legal  ideas  are  central  and  where 
members of the legal community are the main actors. Under certain conditions, this 
marketplace of ideas can provide more wide-ranging and effective tools to deal with 
convergence and divergence. 
 
Against this background, this paper deals with a number of basic issues, explained 
hereunder. At the same time, it also illustrates a number of basic propositions arising 
from the economic analysis of the law. 
 
First of all, this paper examines why different legal systems would diverge (I). That 
part illustrates the basic proposition that the existing state of affairs is not fortuitous 
and will usually turn out to be in equilibrium. In other words, it is the outcome of 
various forces. The “spontaneous”
3 ordering of law (and of society) must at least be 
carefully studied on its merits, and if it is indeed in equilibrium, then it might be 
adequate. Note that in the context of this paper, the existing state of affairs is the legal 
systems as they exist at a given moment, with whatever amount of divergence or 
convergence  might  be  present.  We  are  therefore  not  dealing  with  an  issue  of 
“unbridled”  market  forces  versus  “discipline”  from  the  law,  but  rather  with  the 
higher-level issue of variety amongst legal systems (each of which had to solve the 
first-level issue of whether and if so which law is appropriate to deal with various 
economic and social problems) and legal intervention to constrain that variety. 
 
Secondly, this paper touches upon methodology, i.e. what is divergence and how it 
can be detected (II). This part is not so much concerned with the economic analysis of 
the law, but rather with comparative law methodology. It illustrates a more general 
proposition  arising  from  any  multi-disciplinary  (“Law  +”)  approach  to  the  law, 
namely that it is crucial that the law be seen in a broader context, i.e. including both 
the policy choices underlying it and its practical outcome.  
 
                                                 
3 Of course, there is no such point of reference as a “spontaneous” market economy at the scale and 
level of our large industrialized societies, as economists would sometimes claim. Economics tend to 
take for granted a set of basic law which enables the market economy to work in the first place (usually 
the basic legal disciplines as they would be reflected in codes or the common law). “Spontaneous” 
should perhaps be better read as “bottom-up” in the context of this project. DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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Thirdly, this paper explains under which conditions divergence should be seen as a 
problem (III). Finally, it explores possible solutions to the problem (IV). The last two 
parts rest on another fundamental proposition from economics: almost every change 
involves  a  trade-off.  In  the  words  of  Friedman,  “there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  free 
lunch”.  Jurists  are  notoriously  weak  here.  We  tend  to  focus  on  the  downsides 
(disadvantages, costs) of the current situation and the upsides (advantages, benefits) 
of the envisaged change when deciding whether to change (grey in table below), often 
ignoring  the  upsides  of  the  current  situation  and  the  downsides  of  the  envisaged 
change. 
 
Complete decision matrix  Costs  Benefits 
Current  Cnow  Bnow 
Change  Cafter  Bafter 
 
Obviously, change should only be done if it improves welfare, i.e. if the benefits of 
change minus the costs thereof exceed the benefits of the current situation minus the 
costs thereof. In formal terms, change would be justified if and only if 
now now after after C B C B − > −  
and not merely because 
now after C B >  
 
I.  Why would divergence occur? 
 
When browsing through the legal literature, one cannot escape the impression that 
jurists are slightly (at least) biased against divergence. Convergence, harmonization 
and  even  stronger  phenomena  like  unification  are  often  perceived  as  positive 
developments in and of themselves. Even those who write in praise of divergence 
present it in such a fashion – calling upon irreducible cultural differences beyond 
apprehension
4 – that it seems to border on the irrational, a line of argument which 
ultimately feeds into the bias against divergence. 
 
Still,  why  would  divergence  occur  at  all?  With  the  use  of  economic  theory, 
divergence can be rationally explained with at least three lines of reasoning. 
 
A.  Divergence as a rational but not deliberate phenomenon 
 
Under this line of reasoning, divergence can be explained rationally, but it does not 
necessarily  result  from  a  deliberate  choice  on  the  part  of  those  concerned.  Two 
different strands of economic theory can be brought to bear here. 
 
1.  Informational imperfections 
 
Firstly, divergence can be explained by informational imperfections (or asymmetries) 
as between various jurisdictions. The law progresses in great part as a result of outside 
                                                 
4 Legrand, P. 2003 “A diabolical idea” in Towards a European Civil Code, Kluwer 2004, 245; Legrand, 
P.,  1996  “European  Legal  Systems  Are  Not  Converging."  International  and  Comparative  Law 
Quarterly, 45, 52-81; Teubner, G. “Legal irritants: good faith in British Law or How Unifying Law 
Ends up in new Divergences”, (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11. DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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pressure, which takes the form of new information about the world outside the law 
(e.g. a new case never seen before, technological developments, social evolution, etc.) 
that the law must then process. Legal systems evolve within different informational 
environments. The comparative scholar will often observe that certain areas of the law 
are  more  developed  in  certain  jurisdictions  as  a  result  of  specific  historical 
occurrences.
5 Similarly, larger jurisdictions tend to run ahead of cutting-edge legal 
developments  because  statistically  novel  cases  will  tend  to  arise  there  first. 
Furthermore,  there  will  rarely  be  an  obvious  “perfect  solution”  to  a  given  legal 
problem  that  can  immediately  be  singled  out.  Therefore,  much  like  in  economic 
activity,  when  it  comes  to  the  development  of  the  law,  decisions  taken  under 
asymmetric  (and  imperfect)  information  may  lead  different  actors  onto  different 
paths. 
 
2.  Network effects 
 
Secondly, network economics can also help to explain divergence. The starting point 
is the notion of network effects
6 (also presented as demand-side scale effects): for 
certain  products,  the  value  of  the  product  to  the  individual  user  increases  as  the 
number  of  users  increases.  The  classical  example  is  telecommunications:  in  the 
absence  of  interconnection,  the  value  of  a  subscription  to  a  network  with  1000 
subscribers is much less than that of a subscription to an otherwise identical service 
provided over a network with 1 million subscribers. In telecommunications, network 
effects  are  strong,  but  the  theory  can  also  be  applied  more  loosely  to  other 
phenomena, including fashion and language. It can be ventured that the “market” for 
legal  ideas  is  also  subject  to  network  effects:
7  the  more  members  of  the  legal 
epistemic community subscribe to a given opinion, the more attractive it becomes, 
sometimes  irrespective  of  its  inherent  validity.
8  The  effect  is  not  as  strong  as  in 
telecommunications,  of  course,  since  some  jurists  –  fortunately  so  in  many 
circumstances – can still decide not to be swayed by the mere fact that the majority 
holds a certain view, and try to reverse network effects by convincing their peers to 
espouse another view. 
 
More specifically, two specific properties associated with network effects can explain 
divergence. The first one is called tipping:
9 a small movement in demand can trigger a 
snowball effect.
10 In the case of legal ideas, a single leading decision or a leading 
                                                 
5 For instance the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage in Germany as a result of the Great 
Depression. 
6 Shy, Oz, 2001. The Economics of Network Industries, Cambridge University Press; Lemley, Mark A. 
– McGowan, David “Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects”, in California Law Review, 
May, 1998, p.479; Liebowitz & Margolis in “Network Externality: an uncommon Tragedy”, in Journal 
of  Economic  Perspectives.  1994,  p.  133;  Michael  Katz  and  Carl  Shapiro  “Network  externalities, 
competition and compatibility”, in American Economic Rev. 1985, p.425. 
7  Anthony  Ogus  argued,  for  instance  that  “the  acknowledged  characteristics  of  ‘legal  culture’,  a 
combination of language, conceptual structure and procedures, constitute a network which, because of 
the commonality of usage, reduces the costs of interactive behaviour”. See Ogus, Anthony (2002), ‘The 
Economic Basis of Legal Culture: Networks and Monopolization,’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
2002, vol. 22, at p. 420. 
8 Hence the practice of pointing to the majority and minority views when there is a controversy. 
9 See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, J. Econ. Persp. 
1994, p. 93. 
10 This lies at the heart of the commercial strategy of most firms active in sectors affected by network 
effects. DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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article at a given point in time can quickly lead to the emergence of a majority view. 
The second one is called path dependency: once network effects have worked to the 
advantage of one firm, it becomes very difficult to “change the course of history”.
11 In 
the case of legal ideas,
12 here as well once certain choices have been made and are 
deeply imbedded in the shared knowledge of the legal community, they are difficult to 
reverse. Path dependency can show itself also in a slightly different manner: when 
faced with a new kind of problem that needs an immediate remedy, legal systems tend 




Accordingly, legal systems can evidence divergence as a result of discrete choices 
made differently in the past. Indeed on many issues (for instance, the relationship 
between contract and tort law), if one goes sufficiently far back in time, the same or 
very similar debates can be found in each system until a choice was made. Network 
effects (including tipping and path dependency) amplify the consequences of these 
choices. Sometimes it sufficed that a single leading author or court chose option A in 
one  system  and  B  in  the  other  for  these  two  systems  to  evidence  “irreconcilable 
divergences” later on, after network effects have done their work. The choices made 
at that time might have been the best possible at that particular time in that particular 
legal system. Later on, however, this implies neither that such choices are still the best 
ones, nor that it pays to reverse them, without assessing the costs brought about by 
such change. 
 
B.  Divergence as a rational, deliberate and benign phenomenon 
 
The explanations above assume that divergence does not result from deliberate action. 
The  more  classical  and  traditional  explanation  for  divergence,  however,  involves 
deliberate  choices  made  by  the  members  of  a  community  as  regards  their  legal 
system, in other words local preferences. Because it is intuitive and well-researched, 
this explanation is only briefly summarized here, but this should not take away any of 
its power. 
 
In essence, the legal system reflects the consensus of the community (or at least of the 
ruling class) on the balance to be reached between competing policy interests. Some 
trade-offs are involved, and they are not always resolved in the same manner from 
one community to the other. For instance, in a given community, more emphasis will 
                                                 
11 The classical example (P.A. David “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY”, in Am. Econ Rev. 1985, 
332) is the QWERTY keyboard that once established itself as a standard, could not be replaced by a 
more efficient alternative: the users had been trained in the QWERTY system and could not easily 
switch  all  together  to  the  other  system.  See  Brian,  Arthur,  W.  (1989),  ‘Competing  Technologies, 
Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events’, 97 Economic Journal, 642; Liebowitz, Stan J. 
and Margolis, Stephen E. “Path Dependence” in Bouckaert and De Geest (Eds) Encyclopaedia of Law 
and Economics, 1999. 
12 For earlier applications of these economic concepts to developments in legal rules, see Hataway, O. 
“Path Dependency in the Law: the course and pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System”, 
2001 Iowa Law Review vol. 86, p. 601. Gillette C.P. “Lock-in effects in Law and Norms”, Boston 
University  Law  Review,  1998  vol.  78,  p.  813,  Mark  J.  Roe  “Chaos  and  Evolution  in  Law  and 
Economics”, in Harvard Law Rev. 1995, vol. 109, p. 641. For a study of the effects of path dependency 
in corporate law, see Heine K. and Kerber, W. “European Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition 
and Path Dependence”, in Eur. Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 13, 2002, p. 47. 
13 See Ugo Mattei “Legal Systems in Distress: HIV-contaminated Blood, Path Dependency and Legal 
Change” in Global Jurist Advances, Volume 1, Issue 2 2001 Article 4. DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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be put on ensuring that injured persons receive compensation, while in another one, 
the need not to overburden economic actors with liability claims will prevail. The 
laws of these respective communities will then most likely diverge. 
 
C.  Divergence as a rational, deliberate but less benign phenomenon 
 
A third line of argument builds on the previous one, but adds a twist. Whereas the 
previous account assumes deliberate decisions taken in good faith and with a view to 
the public interest, public choice theory
14 would consider the production of law as a 
market responding to general economic principles, for instance demand and supply 
models,  pricing  theory,  etc.  Accordingly,  the  production  of  law  will  favour  the 
interests who are best able to articulate their demand and offer a valuable counterpart 
to the producer of law. Public choice theory can be used to explain lawmaking in 
complex settings involving interest groups, lobbying and other features of modern-
day democracies. 
 
Public  choice  theory  can  account  for  divergence  as  a  rational  and  deliberate 
phenomenon. However, the outcome in each jurisdiction might be affected by market 
imperfections, including the presence of market power on the part of certain interest 
groups  vying  for  the  production  of  law,  or  information  asymmetries  (the  interest 
groups know more than the lawmakers and choose to disclose only that information 
which  serves  their  interest).  The  outcome  is  thus  not  necessarily  in  line  with  the 
general public interest in that jurisdiction. It could be ventured that the presence in 
certain jurisdictions of very developed systems of admissibility control in public law 
claims,  for  instance,  reflects  success  by  the  administration  in  influencing  the 
production  of  law  (here  administrative  procedure)  rather  than  the  greater  general 
good. 
 
One of the most powerful interest groups is the legal profession: it can be argued that 
it represents, in fact, the main driving force for maintaining divergences, especially 
under the pretence of “legal culture”. The conceptual device of “legal culture” allows 
the legal profession to keep the tensions and debates alluded to above within its ranks, 
and hide behind a monolithic façade, which moreover is made opaque to outsiders by 
being presented as a “culture”. The legal profession can then protect and perpetuate its 
“monopoly” on its legal “culture”.
15 
 
D.  Concluding note 
 
Three different lines of argument were explored, all of which would explain why the 
law  could  be  different  from  one  place  to  the  other,  and  would  do  so  in  a  more 
                                                 
14 Stigler, George J. “The theory of Economic Regulation”, in Bell Journal Econ. & Management 
Science 1971, vol. 2, p. 3; Becker, Gary “A Theory of Pressure Groups for Political Influence”, Q.J. 
Econ. 1983, vol. 98 p. 371; Mueller, Dennis C., Public Choice II, Cambridge University Press, 1989; 
Farber, Daniel A. and Frickey, Philip P., Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction, University of 
Chicago Press, 1991. 
15 This also helps explaining the lawyers’ asymmetric attitude towards “importing” foreign legal rules, 
as compared to “exporting” own legal solutions. See Ogus, A. (1999), ‘Competition Between National 
Legal  Systems:  A  Contribution  of  Economic  Analysis  to  Comparative  Law,’  International  and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 48: 405-418; Ogus, A. (2002), ‘The Economic Basis of Legal Culture: 
Networks and Monopolization,’ cit. at footnote 7; Hadfield, G.K., “The Price of Law: How the Market 
for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System.” Michigan Law Review, 2000, vol. 98, p. 953 DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
P. Larouche - F. Chirico  Page 7  14/12/2005 
convincing fashion than endless invocations of irreducible differences between legal 
cultures: it is inaccurate to consider that the state of a legal system at a given moment 
is the single and unavoidable outcome of a monolithic legal culture pertaining to that 
system. Rather, each legal system is rife with tensions and debates (at least at an 
academic level). Legal systems are open to many potential directions, and their state 
at a given moment is simply the outcome of certain policy choices – deliberate or not 
– that are neither pre-determined nor irreversible over time. 
 
It  will  be  noted  that  these  lines  of  argument  do  not  require  a  specific  level  of 
comparison. They can explain differences between legal systems, of course, but they 
could also explain differences within a single legal system. Their point of reference is 
not a geographical territory or a hierarchical entity (legal system), but rather a legal 
epistemic community. 
 
More importantly, these three lines of argument can explain conceptual divergence 
equally well as explicit divergence. It makes no difference whether a common term is 
used or not. 
 
II.  When is there divergence? 
 
In the light of the foregoing, there appears to be ample reason for divergence (explicit 
or conceptual) to appear. A foray into methodology is then necessary, to ensure that 
divergence will only be found where it really exists.
16 First of all, a specific remark is 
made  concerning  conceptual  divergence  specifically  and  the  “keyword  trap”  (A), 
before going more generally into the methodology used to assess divergence (B). 
 
A.  The keyword trap 
 
In the case of conceptual divergence, there could be a methodological trap at work, 
having  to  do  with  the  focus  on  keywords  (including  short  key  phrases  of  a  few 
words). Jurists like to work with keywords, since it simplifies their task considerably 
by enabling them to put a shorthand label on subsets of the law in a given legal 
system. A whole piece of legal architecture is subsumed in one keyword: for instance, 
the  set  of  rules  and  concepts  concerning  cases  where  a  decision-maker  has  some 
degree of freedom in reaching an outcome becomes “discretion”. The meaning of 
“discretion” as a keyword can only be found by retrieving the subset of the law which 
it is meant to represent. Accordingly, that meaning will be linked with the rest of the 
legal system in question (and the broader context within which this system operates). 
 
Unfortunately, keywords have the unfortunate tendency to take a life of their own. 
They then cease to be treated as shorthand labels whose meaning is to be found by 
looking at the underlying subset of law which the keyword is meant to represent. 
Instead, jurists will then believe that the keyword has an inherent meaning in and of 
itself, i.e. that the meaning of the keyword resides in the keyword itself.
17  
 
                                                 
16 This part of the paper is based more on research experience in comparative law and inter-disciplinary 
work with economists than on standard law and economics literature. 
17 See on this point Hart, H. “Definition and theory in jurisprudence” (1954) 70 LQR 37; Ross, A. “Tu-
tu” (1957) 70 Harvard Law Review 812. DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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Under those circumstances, there is a fair chance that misunderstandings can occur. 
Two persons from different legal systems use the same keyword – or better even, 
what appears to be the same keyword in different linguistic version – and expect it to 
mean one and the same thing, since it is assumed that the meaning is in the keyword. 
Yet they fail to realize that, on a proper view where the meaning is rather found by 
referring to the subset which the keyword represents, the same keyword can have 
different meanings. Conceptual divergence lurks. 
 
It is therefore crucial that jurists beware of the keyword trap. The mere fact that the 
same keyword, the same shorthand label, is found in two different systems (or appears 
to be found once translated), does not imply convergence. On a proper view, one must 
consider keywords as shorthand labels and look beyond them to the subset of the legal 
system which they are meant to represent. Only then can a conclusion be reached as to 
whether  there  is  convergence  or  not.  Presumably,  the  same  keyword  used  in  two 
different legal systems will often actually represent a different subset respectively in 
each system. Does that then necessarily imply conceptual divergence? 
 
B.  A functional methodology to ascertain divergence 
 
At this juncture, it is interesting to digress briefly into a comparison with economics. 
Jurists  work  only  with  language,  which  suffers  from  an  inherent  degree  of 
indeterminacy. Economists, on the other hand,  rely  on much more formal tools – 
namely mathematical models, empirical measurements, etc. – in addition to language. 
Nevertheless,  language  remains  the  prime  means  of  communication  between 
economists, and like jurists they use keywords to simplify communications. When 
two economists differ in opinion when discussing with each other (using language), 
they  go  back  to  the  underlying  theories  and  models  (and  formal  mathematical 
language). They check their conclusions against these theories and models, verifying 
that assumptions are satisfied and that the theories and models being used are really 
applicable to the situation at hand. In the end, perceived divergences at the so-called 
“intuitive” level, using language and keywords, can be tested against theories and 
models whose formalism enables a conclusion to be reached. Either the divergence is 
removed, or it is attributed to gaps or open issues in economics. These can then be 
addressed as such. 
 
Coming back to law, there is no set of formal tools which could be used to reach a 
conclusion on a perceived divergence across legal systems. Nevertheless, jurists have 
developed methods to test for divergence (and, in the case of conceptual divergence, 
to avoid the keyword trap).  
 
For instance,  classical comparative law tends to take a point from within the law 
(typically a keyword) as a basis for comparison. Each legal system will be entered 
into from that point. Typically, that point will be put in context with its immediate 
surroundings and even with the whole legal system.
18 The inquiry is quite descriptive. 
Very often, a finding of divergence will be returned. The conclusion will tend to be 
that  (even  if  there  is  an  apparent  similarity  in  keywords),  the  underlying  legal 
concepts, the legal reasoning and ultimately even the “legal cultures” differ. Very 
                                                 
18 In the case of conceptual divergence, this amounts to looking beyond the keyword and retrieving the 
subset which this keyword represents DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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often, the civil law/common law divide will bear the blame for this (when the sample 
of legal systems under study allows for it). 
 
Yet ascertaining differences in legal concepts, reasoning and “culture” should not be 
enough to warrant a finding of divergence. After all, the inquiry is descriptive and 
offers  no  objective  test  to  support  its  conclusion.  A  more  solid  methodology  is 
needed,  namely  a  functionalist  methodology.
19  This  involves  looking  beyond  the 
“middle layer” of legal concepts and reasoning to incorporate also the “upper layer” 
of  policy  considerations  and  the  “bottom  layer”  of  practical  outcomes.
  Instead  of 
beginning the inquiry via an endogenous point in the law, the starting point is rather 
found outside the law, by way of a practical problem.
20 That practical problem is 
common to all legal systems under study (e.g. “two cars collide at an intersection”). 
The aim of the inquiry is then to ascertain whether legal systems, seen broadly with 
their respective three layers, produce the same or a similar outcome on the basis of 
roughly the same policy considerations. Whether the legal concepts and reasoning 
used  in  doing  so  are  similar  should  not  be  of  prime  relevance.  Only  when  the 
outcomes differ (usually because the policy issues have been settled differently) is 
there a sufficient basis for a finding of divergence. 
 
For instance, the laws of France, Germany and England do diverge on the treatment of 
pure economic loss under the law of liability. However, within that sample, the laws 
of Germany and England tend to converge both at the policy and at the outcome 
level,
21 even if they evidence differences in legal concepts and reasoning. French law 
differs fundamentally from both, however, in policy and outcomes. The divergence is 
thus mainly between German and English law, on the one hand, and French law, on 
the other. In all of this, the civil law / common law divide is of secondary significance 
as an explanatory factor. 
 
Such a functionalist approach improves on the classical comparative law approach by 
enabling an objective test. Indeed the starting point is not an unreliable endogenous 
point  within  the  law,  but  rather  a  constant  exogenous  point  (a  practical  problem 
arising in every legal system). Furthermore, the conclusion is reached on the basis of 
outcomes, which are usually easier to quantify and compare (it is either one or the 
other outcome) than rules and concepts.  In the end, if a difference in  outcome is 
measured for the same starting point, then one cannot escape the conclusion that the 
legal systems do diverge. If they originally appeared to converge because of common 
or similar keywords, then we have a proven case of conceptual divergence: despite 
common  keywords,  the  legal  systems  produce  different  outcomes  when  examined 
from a single common starting point. 
 
                                                 
19 For more on this and on the functional approach in general, see the work of the Ius Commune 
Casebook Project, in particular the Casebook on Tort Law. 
20 The functionalist method usually relies on a set of facts as a starting point. Within the EC context, 
however, it is also possible to use as a starting point a piece of EC legislation, most often a directive. 
This piece of EC law applies in all legal systems and places all systems under the same constraint 
(implementation), and it is then interesting to examine how each legal system receives and implements 
that piece of EC law. 
21 Save for the fact that Germany tends to make greater use of contract law devices to soften the impact 
of the disallowance of recovery for pure economic loss. DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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If the methodology just described is used, we venture that the number of cases of 
divergence – explicit or conceptual – is likely to be lower than might appear at first 
sight. 
 
III.  What is wrong with divergence? 
 
In the previous two parts, we have seen that divergence can be explained rationally, 
and  that,  on  a  proper  methodological  approach,  it  is  probably  less  frequent  than 
suspected. 
 
Once there is a finding of divergence, the discussion is naturally drawn to the more 
normative question of whether it is undesirable. 
 
In the first part of this paper, three lines of argument were set out to explain why 
divergence can occur. It can be noted that of the three, only the “local preference” 
argument  –  the  second  one  –  provides  a  stable  (and  strong)  explanation  for 
divergence. Still, local preferences can evolve. The first line of argument (rational but 
not  deliberate)  implies  that  divergence  can  disappear  over  time,  if  information 
imperfections are removed. Network effects can work in favour of one or another 
outcome and would not prevent divergence from disappearing.
22 The third line of 
argument (rational, deliberate but not benign) implies that divergence results in part 
from different power configurations which are not necessarily stable. 
 
Even then, the mere fact that divergence is not stable over time does not mean that it 
is undesirable. Beyond purely legal arguments against divergence (A), which are not 
conclusive, there are some economic reasons why divergence should be addressed 
(B). 
 
A.  Convergence as a value in and of itself 
 
Here, we jurists sometimes fall into the classical trap of thinking that convergence 
(and ultimately unity) in the law is a value in and of itself. 
 
First of all, convergence has enormous intellectual appeal, but that of course is not a 
sufficient justification. 
 
Secondly, jurists sometimes put forward rights-based arguments for convergence: it 
would be everyone’s right to have similar situations be treated in the same way across 
legal systems or communities. Given the arguments made above to explain why there 
might be divergence, we do not think that a mere assertion of rights is sufficient to 
trump the cards.
23 
                                                 
22 In fact, in network markets, network effects can be overcome and a new solution can replace the one 
previously in place, not necessarily by means of a top-down intervention, but also through bottom-up 
provision of incentives to transition. 
23 In Bhagwati J. “The demand to reduce domestic diversity among trading nations”, in Fair Trade and 
Harmonization, eds. J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, Cambridge MA: MIT Press 1996, at page 9 et seq., a 
survey of the arguments against diversity is presented, by highlighting (1) the philosophical arguments 
(basic  human  rights  beyond  national  borders,  distributive  justice  and  fairness),  (2)  the  structural 
arguments  (globalisation),  (3)  the  economic  arguments  (domestic  decisions  impairing  international 
trade; distributive concerns and predation) and (4) the political arguments (protectionism and the need 
for a common set of standards within an integrated union). DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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A third but related argument is very present in EC law, namely the need to ensure the 
effectiveness of the law (here, EC law). This argument pertains more to conceptual 
divergence within a larger system such as EC law: it would be essential to ensure that 
EC law is interpreted, applied and enforced the same way throughout the EU, lest it 
lose  its  effectiveness.  After  all,  the  ECJ  has  construed  the  EC  Treaty  in  a  very 
purposive fashion, which naturally leads to emphasizing effectiveness.  
 
At the same time, throughout its case-law, the ECJ is also willing to accept a degree 
of divergence in the laws of the Member States. For instance, it might appear that the 
case-law on the internal market is naturally favourable to convergence, given the ease 
with which the ECJ will conclude, often without empirical evidence, that a specific 
provision  in  a  given  Member  State  constitutes  a  barrier  to  the  free  movement  of 
goods, workers, services, capital or the freedom of establishment of firms and self-
employed  persons.  At  the  same  time,  the  “rule  of  reason”  developed  to  save 
restrictions on the free movement of goods in Cassis de Dijon
24 and subsequently 
extended  to  other  freedoms  enables  vast  areas  of  law  to  remain  divergent  across 
Member  States.  Similarly,  in  the  line  of  case-law  including  Keck
25  and  Gourmet 
International
26,  the  ECJ  retreats  on  its  earlier  statements  and  leaves  potentially 
divergent Member State laws outside of the realm of Article 28 EC. 
 
More  recently,  the  judgment  in  the  Tobacco  Advertising  case
27  provides  a  useful 
reminder that convergence is not a value in and of itself. Writing about the availability 
of Article 95 EC as a legal basis, the Court stated that:
28 
 
[i]f a mere finding of disparities between national rules and of the abstract risk of 
obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms or of distortions of competition 
liable to result therefrom were sufficient to justify the choice of Article [95] as a 
legal  basis,  judicial  review  of  compliance  with  the  proper  legal  basis  might  be 
rendered nugatory. 
 
In Tobacco Advertising, the ECJ laid down the bases for a more economic approach 
to the use of Article 95 EC as a legal basis. Indeed from an economic perspective, the 
mere fact of divergence is not undesirable.  
In order to come to a normative conclusion, the assessment must look more broadly at 
the costs and benefits of divergence (and in a later step, discussed below under part 
IV, at the costs and benefits of removing divergence).
29 
 
B.  The costs associated with divergence 
 
1.  Starting point: benefits, but no costs 
                                                 
24 ECJ, 20 February 1979, Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein 
[1979] ECR 649 
25 ECJ, 24 November 1993, Keck and Mithouard, joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, [1993] ECR I-
06097 
26  ECJ,  8  March  2001,  Case  C-405/98,  Konsumentombudsmannen  (KO)  v  Gourmet  International 
Products AB (GIP) [2001] ECR I-01795 
27 ECJ, 5 October 2000, Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament [2000] ECR I-8419. 
28 At Rec. 84. 
29  An  obvious  point  for  economists.  See,  for  example,  in  the  context  of  discussions  concerning 
harmonisation: Sun, Jeanne-Mey and Pelkmans, Jacques Regulatory Competition in the Single Market 
in Journal of Common Market Studies, 1995, vol. 33, p. 67. DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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The benefits of divergence flow from the lines of argumentation put forward earlier. 
They  are strongest when divergence is  explained by local preferences. Each legal 
system is then better attuned to its respective reality: when they reflect differences in 
preferences  of  different  communities,  divergences  are  in  principle  preferable  to  a 
unified  solution  since  the  latter  will  not,  by  definition,  match  every  community’s 
needs equally well.
30 Since variety increases utility, social welfare is enhanced. 
 
Moreover, since the most suitable solution is hardly, if ever, known in advance, the 
existence of different solutions can enable a learning process towards the discovery of 
the most appropriate one.
31  
 
In principle, divergence as such does not create costs. To be sure, in presence of a 
divergence between legal systems, acknowledging it and being aware of alternative 
solutions  can  help  highlighting  the  possible  costs  associated  with  a  certain  legal 
choice within  a  given legal system. However, in such cases,  costs are  not due to 
divergence  but  are  caused  by  unsatisfactory  choices  made  in  the  past.  This  is 
especially true when divergence is explained not by local preferences but rather by 
non-deliberate factors (information asymmetries, network effects) or via public choice 
theory (pressure of interest groups).
32 In such cases, the existence of divergence does 
not constitute ground for harmonisation, but may prompt domestic revision of own 
inefficient legal choices and eventually lead to a change.  
 
2.  The more realistic case: benefits but also costs 
 
Positive costs are usually generated, however, when diverging systems are actually 
communicating  with  each  other.  Communication  can  take  place  through  various 
means,  be  it  trade  in  goods,  movement  of  persons,  etc.  Certainly  this  kind  of 
communication can be considered as an increasingly recurrent feature when markets 
are integrating.  
 
More specifically, when diverging systems communicate, the following costs might 
arise: 
 
1.  Externalities: Normally, the state of the law should reflect the choices made in 
a  given  jurisdiction,  in  the  light  of  the  various  tradeoffs  involved.  It  is 
possible, however, that the choices made in a jurisdiction impose costs which 
are  borne  by  another  jurisdiction,  in  which  case  the  choice  of  the  first 
jurisdiction is not based on a complete picture of costs and benefits (tradeoffs) 
involved. A typical example is environmental legislation in the presence of 
cross-border effects (water and air flows across boundaries). In the presence of 
externalities,  there  is  no  reason  to  respect  divergence  arising  from  local 
preferences (e.g. minimal pollution controls upstream), since they can result in 
sub-optimal results overall (e.g. unwanted pollution downstream). A similar 
problem  may  arise  if  a  state  has  a  lax  competition  policy  that  allows  the 
                                                 
30 Save for what is discussed in the subsequent section. 
31  Hayek,  F.  “Competition  as  a  Discovery  Procedure”  in  Hayek  (ed)  New  Studies  in  Philosophy, 
Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, 1978 Chicago p. 179-190 
32 See above at pages 2 et seq. DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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formation  of  cartels  which  then  negatively  affect  consumers  in  other 
jurisdictions to the benefit of domestic firms. 
 
2.  Transaction  costs:  When  there  is  trade  between  jurisdictions,  divergence 
creates  transaction  costs.  Indeed  participants  in  trade  –  sellers  as  well  as 
buyers  –  must  acquire  knowledge  about  the  legal  situation  in  other 
jurisdictions in order to engage into trade efficiently (otherwise, they incur 
risks). They must incur the costs necessary to draft contracts according to each 
legal system in which they are doing business and they must incur the costs of 
possible  litigation  under  multiple  legal  regimes.  The  risks  associated  with 
unexpected changes in each of the legal systems concerned by the transaction 
also  represent  costs  for  cross-border  economic  actors  and  so  on.
33  
On  the  seller  side,  for  examples,  this  means  that  products,  terms  and 
conditions, etc., must be adapted to meet the legal requirements of a number of 
jurisdictions, thereby increasing the cost of production and consequently the 
price. On the buyer side, not only is the price higher due to the just mentioned 
extra costs, but also the cost of buying can be increased; more likely, however 
(especially with consumers), buyers would refrain from buying outside of their 
jurisdiction. The same applies to business transactions other than sale and even 
to personal endeavours (employment, family matters). Besides these “static” 
effects,  also  dynamic  ones  can  be  identified  on  a  macro-economic  level, 
namely  the  reduction  in  the  international  trade  volume,  in  the  level  of 
investment, consumption and income and ultimately in the economic growth.
34 
 
Transaction costs offer a very powerful argument against divergence. With 
respect  to  consumers  and  persons  in  general,  transaction  cost  analysis  can 
reinforce rights-based arguments: the right of a person to be treated the same 
way irrespective of the legal system in question can be justified because it is 
deemed unacceptable that persons should bear the transaction costs associated 
with divergent legal systems. 
 
Externalities  and  transaction  costs  are  the  standard  arguments  used  to  support  the 
conclusion that a given instance of divergence is undesirable. These arguments apply 
equally to conceptual or explicit divergence. Presumably, transaction costs are higher 
in the case of conceptual divergence, since the precise scope of the divergence is 
harder to ascertain. 
 
In addition, a third type of cost could be associated with conceptual divergence only, 
namely costs arising from information imperfections. Indeed conceptual divergence 
differs from explicit divergence in that, on the surface, the same term is used, but with 
diverging concepts. Ideally, if acquiring information were costless, individuals and 
firms would spend enough resources to ascertain the legal situation that they would 
come  across  conceptual  divergences  as  well.  Since,  unfortunately,  obtaining 
information  is  costly,  parties  will  invest  resources  in  such  activity  only  until  its 
                                                 
33 On the costs of diversity, see Ribstein, Larry E., and Kobayashi, Bruce H. (1996), “An Economic 
Analysis of Uniform State Laws” 25 Journal of Legal Studies p. 131, at p. 138 et seq.. 
34 More extensively on this, see H. Wagner “Economic Analysis of Cross-Border Legal Uncertainty – 
The  example  of  the  European  Union”,  in  Jan  Smits  (ed)  The  need  of  a  European  Contract  Law. 
Empirical and Legal Perspectives, Europa Law Publishing 2005. DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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marginal cost equals the marginal benefit.
35 There is therefore a risk that they will not 
look beyond the surface and will then take decisions based on the assumption that the 
same term is conceptualized in the same way in every jurisdiction, only later to find 
out that their assumption was wrong (at their cost, but perhaps also to their benefit). 
They could thus be misled into taking decisions which they would not have taken with 
complete information on the status of the law. This can lead to inefficiencies, in the 
form of unsuspected losses or extra costs to undo mistakes. In the end, the uncertainty 
and the risk of hidden conceptual divergences arising only after the transaction has 
been entered into, if too extensive, could result in economic actors refraining from 
cross-border trade. 
 
In  sum,  divergence  is  not  undesirable  as  such.  Yet  in  many  cases  it  engenders 
significant costs, such as externalities, transaction costs and (in the case of conceptual 
divergence) costs arising from information imperfections. These costs can exceed the 
benefits from divergence and thus justify the conclusion that divergence should be 
addressed.  However,  the  inquiry  does  not  end  here.  It  must  still  be  ascertained 
whether change would lead to an improvement. 
 
IV.  What can be done about divergence? 
 
A number of options are available to deal with a situation in which divergence would 
be undesirable. 
 
A.  Do nothing and leave the market to deal with it 
 
At  the  outset,  it  must  be  remembered  that  markets  typically  provide  “private” 
solutions  to  deal  with  certain  costs  associated  with  diverging  legal  systems.  Such 
solutions do not in fact eliminate divergences but constitute a way to factor them into 
the choices of economic actors. 
 
First of all, if parties can influence the law through contract, they will likely do so. In 
commercial contracts, for one, parties can either opt for one or the other legal system 
(or a third one) or define the law inter partes themselves. 
 
Secondly,  the  legal  profession  can  assist  market  players  in  reducing  the  costs  of 
divergence by providing accurate advice, thereby minimizing transaction costs and 
the  costs  of  information imperfections  linked  with  conceptual  divergence.  In  fact, 
through their work, legal professionals contribute to identifying cases of conceptual 
divergence. Over time, once these cases become common knowledge, the information 
imperfections  are  eliminated  and  conceptual  divergence  becomes  equivalent  to 
explicit divergence in economic terms. 
 
Thirdly, in commercial but also in consumer relationships, the insurance market can 
offer a possibility to translate divergence into quantitative terms, i.e. an insurance 
premium. In the case of liability laws, in particular, insurers have superior knowledge 
of the state of the law in each market and can provide a lower-cost alternative to 
                                                 
35 This is referred to as rational ignorance: I will spend on information only to the point when the last 
bit of information I have acquired allows me to reap net additional benefits. DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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endless  inquiries,  product  modifications,  etc.  If  a  firm  wants  to  keep  relatively 
uniform prices, it can then equalize the cost of insurance over all of its customers. 
 
Thirdly, large and multinational companies are generally familiar with dealing with 
multiple  legal  systems  and  have  developed  the  necessary  structures  for  cost-
minimising information gathering, thanks also to economies of scale. In fact, they 
might find worthwhile to develop international standards for contracts and products; 
those standards could bring about some sort of “harmonisation”.
36 In such cases, the 
interest  of  Member  States  (or  of  the  European  Commission)  would  rather  lie  in 
making  sure  that  such  standard-setting  activities  do  not  conceal  competition  law 
infringements. 
 
These  solutions  can  only  work  in  certain  cases:  for  instance,  divergences  in 
administrative procedure cannot be compensated via contract or insurance. Moreover, 
for SMEs
37 and consumers, such solutions might be less affordable or practicable. In 
situations  where  they  are  available,  however,  these  market-based  solutions  can  be 
attractive, especially if there are no externalities involved and the costs associated 
with divergence (transaction costs, information imperfections as the case may be) are 
limited in comparison with the value of the overall activity.  
 
Market-based solutions apply equally to explicit and conceptual divergence. It can be 
added, however, that when parties themselves draft in the contract the law applicable 
to their transaction, they must be aware of the existence of a conceptual divergence 
and  explicitly  address  the  problem,  otherwise  the  contract  will  become  itself  the 
source of the hidden divergence, instead of removing it. 
 
B.  Top-down harmonization 
 
Jurists  tend  to  be  less  sanguine  than  economists  about  divergence  between  legal 
systems, and they readily see it as a problem. What is more, they often propose to 
remedy that problem with a fairly drastic solution, namely harmonization or even 
unification of the law. In such a process, the respective laws of each legal system, on 
the  area  when  divergence  is  deemed  problematic,  are  replaced  by  a  single  law 
common to all systems. 
 
Looking back at the costs associated with divergence, as they were identified above, 
the case for harmonization is most compelling when divergence leads to externalities. 
In such cases, given that market players and national legislators are unable to decide 
on the basis of a complete picture of costs and benefits, it is unlikely that an efficient 
outcome will be reached. Indeed, externalities are a typical form of market failure 
which requires intervention by public authorities. 
 
The benefits of (successful) harmonization, including uniform implementation, are 
that the costs of divergence are removed: 
-  externalities are addressed and removed; 
                                                 
36 In this sense, H. Wagner, cit. supra at footnote 34, and the references contained therein. 
37 It has been noted, however, that in the debate launched by the Commission on the harmonisation of 
contract law at the European level, some associations of SMEs have expressed their opposition to full 
harmonisation. DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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-  transaction costs are eliminated, since cross-border activities will be subject to 
the same set of rules in all the relevant legal systems; 
-  information imperfections disappear, since parties can rely on the common 
legal framework thus established. 
As  a  consequence,  cross-border  activity  would  be  boosted  and  so  would  also 
investment, consumption and growth.  
 
Furthermore, there might be occasions where economies of scale are possible, thus 
justifying  the  need  of  a uniform  solution.  This  might  be  the  case  of  problems  of 
complex technical nature that are more cheaply dealt with in a one-stop-shop setting. 
 
As mentioned at the outset, however, jurists tend to ignore the benefits of the current 
situation and the costs associated with change. Even if divergence leads to costs, it is 
conceivable that harmonization would generate even higher costs.
38  
 
1.  A superficial cost-benefit analysis of harmonization 
 
At a superficial level, harmonization removes the benefits associated with divergence, 
first and foremost that the law is better attuned to local preferences. Presumably, if 
divergence  were  found  to  be  a  problem,  it  is  because  the  costs  flowing  from 
divergence exceed those benefits, and therefore if harmonization can remove these 
costs, it would still produce an overall benefit even if the benefits of divergence were 
removed by the same token.  
 
On that count, harmonization will always be beneficial and indeed jurists would be 
right to focus solely on the costs of the current situation and the benefits of change. 
 
2.  A more complete cost-benefit analysis 
 
The  above  analysis  is  incomplete  on  two  accounts:  harmonization  itself  generates 
costs (as opposed to the mere removal of the benefits of the current situation), and the 
benefits of harmonization must be discounted to reflect uncertainty as to realization. 
 
Harmonization generates costs of its own, which must also be taken into account. 
First of all, the production of the harmonized legislation is costly, involving as it does 
extensive background studies and discussions. Costs also arise because of the need of 
“developing  new  bureaucracies  or  demolishing  old  structures”.
39  Costs  are  also 
incurred in order to adapt to the new rules, in terms of information spreading and re-
training. 
 
Secondly  and  more  fundamentally,  it  is  a  rare  occurrence  where  the  area  to  be 
harmonized is relatively autonomous within the law as a whole. More frequently, this 
area interacts with the rest of the law. For instance, product liability or State liability 
for breaches of EC law are part of the law of liability and more generally of private 
and/or public law. Ahead of harmonization, each legal system is in an equilibrium of 
sorts: the various areas of the law are supposedly seamlessly integrated into the legal 
system. Top-down harmonization, coming from the outside, implies a break within 
                                                 
38 There is a shared presumption in the literature that full harmonisation generally brings about higher 
costs than those caused by maintaining diversity.  
39 H. Wagner cit. supra at footnote 34. DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
P. Larouche - F. Chirico  Page 17  14/12/2005 
the legal system, i.e. the creation of a specific “harmonized area” which co-exists with 
other  remaining  areas.  In  the  ideal  situation,  implementing  (incorporating)  the 
harmonized law should be done seamlessly, without distorting the legal system. For 
instance,  under  EC  law,  the  very  mechanism  of  the  directive  is  meant  to  allow 
Member States for some room to adapt the harmonized law to their legal system and 
thereby  minimize  distortions.  The  ideal  being  an  ideal,  more  often  than  not 
harmonization  will  generate  distortions  within  the  legal  system  or  miss  its  goal 
because harmonization is undone at the implementation stage (as mentioned above), 
or even both. 
 
When faced with such distortions as a result of harmonization, legal systems can react 
in  two  ways.  Firstly,  via  a  kind  of  ripple  effect,  the  changes  introduced  in  the 
harmonized area can induce further changes outside of the harmonized area in order 
to restore the system to a seamless equilibrium. There are numerous examples of 
Member States using the implementation of a directive as an opportunity to change a 
broader area of their law (often in a spirit of “cleaning up”). Such a ripple effect 
generates costs, but they are limited in time. Secondly, the legal system can treat the 
harmonized area as a form of foreign body (Fremdkörper) and seek to isolate it. For 
an example, see the reaction of German courts and writers to the introduction of State 
liability  for  breaches  of  EC  law  via  the  Francovich  and  Brasserie  du  Pêcheur 
judgments. The ensuing tension within the legal system generates costs on a lasting 
basis. 
 
Moreover,  the  need  to  legislate  in  many  languages  –  leading  to  often  lamented 
inaccuracies, even within the same language
40 – may facilitate the reproduction of the 
divergence in the implementation phase. 
 
The above analysis applies to explicit as well as conceptual divergences. However, 
given the complexity of the law, harmonization exercises sometimes end up replacing 
explicit  divergence  with  conceptual  divergence  or  merely  pushing  conceptual 
divergence deeper, so that it does not deliver all the expected benefits. There is an 
illusion of convergence in terminology and presumably a fair amount of conceptual 
overlap, but somewhere at the conceptual level undesirable divergence was found. If 
this happens as the result of an harmonisation effort aiming at removing externalities 
and costs of an existing divergence, then it will instead merely replace such costs with 
new ones, perhaps adding those peculiar to conceptual divergences. 
 
In  addition  to  the  above  costs  of  harmonization,  by  implication  the  benefits  of 
harmonization  must  be  discounted  with  a  higher  degree  of  uncertainty  as  to  the 
results. By the same token, it is more likely that harmonization will induce significant 
distortions and thus costs. 
 
Accordingly, top-down harmonization efforts must be analysed as a trade-off between 
the benefits of harmonization and the costs associated with inducing distortions within 
legal systems. 
 
                                                 
40  See,  for  example,  Barbara  Pozzo,  “Harmonisation  of  European  Contract  Law  and  the  need  of 
Creating a Common terminology”, in European Priv. Law Rev. 2003, p. 754. DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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C.  Bottom-up alternatives: regulatory competition and the marketplace of legal 
ideas 
 
Between  doing  nothing  and  introducing  top-down  harmonization,  there  is  a  third 
option,  namely  relying  on  bottom-up  processes  to  bring  about  convergence  when 
needed.  This  is  essentially  a  more  sophisticated  version  of  the  doing  nothing 
alternative, or to use an oxymoron, doing nothing with a plan. 
 
If legal systems diverge but they do communicate with each other through trade and 
other forms of exchange, they will also communicate at the intellectual level, in the 
proverbial  marketplace  of  ideas.  If  the  various  legal  epistemic  communities  are 
introduced to each other’s ideas, one could expect that they will compare them. Over 
time,  they  might  adopt  the  policies,  concepts,  reasoning  or  outcomes  of  another 
community  if  they  are  convinced  that  it  is  preferable.  A  certain  amount  of 
convergence will then result. 
 
Of course, if divergence echoes local preferences, one could object that local law will 
remain  in  place  even  after  the  comparison.  However,  in  many  cases,  the  need  to 
reduce  transaction  costs  and  improve  trade  will  act  as  a  counterweight  and  will 
provide an incentive to move away from a law based strictly on local preferences.
41  
 
This is the theory of regulatory competition:
42 it considers legal rules as a “product” 
and  depicts  law-makers  in  the  different  legal  systems
43  as  the  suppliers  of  such 
product. On a given topic,
44 different law-makers compete with each other for the 
provision of the legal rules that are more attractive to their “customers”, intended as 
individuals as well as firms. Those “customers”, in turn, respond by relocating in the 
jurisdiction whose set of rules best suits their preferences.
45 This way, law-makers are 
pushed to experiment and try to find out the best legal rule (so-called “race to the 
top”). Legal systems will eventually converge towards such “best” legal solution.  
 
This theory has been used extensively to explain developments in American company 
law,
46 as one of the topical legal fields where legislators compete to attract businesses 
to  incorporate  within  the  boundaries  of  their  jurisdiction.  The  ECJ  judgments  in 
                                                 
41  It  has  been  remarked,  however,  that  some  areas  of  law  might  be  deeply  connected  with  local 
preferences and therefore less subject to regulatory competition and that this might in particular be the 
case of “interventionist” law, as opposed to “facilitative” law. See A. Ogus “The economic basis of 
legal culture” cit. supra at footnote 7  
42 R. van den Bergh (2000), “Towards an Institutional Legal Framework for Regulatory Competition in 
Europe”, Kyklos p. 435; D. Esty, and D. Geradin (2001), “Regulatory Competition and Co-opetition”: 
in  Esty  &  Geradin  (Eds)  Regulatory  Competition  and  Economic  Integration:  Comparative 
Perspectives, Oxford University Press; Anthony Ogus, (1999), “Competition Between National Legal 
Systems”, cit supra at footnote 15. 
43 Or at different levels in a single legal system with a federal structure. 
44 This is generally the case for legislators that, each within their geographical borders, have the power 
to regulate the same kind of situations.  
45 The so-called “vote by feet” as developed by Tiebout, in relation to the provision of public goods, in 
his influential article “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”, in Journal of Political Economy 1956, p. 
416. 
46  Romano,  R.  “Law  as  a  product:  some  pieces  of  the  incorporation  puzzle”,  Journal  of  Law, 
Economics and Organisation, vol. 1, 1985 p. 225.  DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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Centros
47 and Überseering,
48 by affirming the incorporation principle,
49 may allow 
the same kind of competition also in the European setting.
50  
 
To be sure, critics of the theory have argued that such competition may easily lead to 
the degradation of legal standards in order to attract more business (by, for instance, 
relaxing the protection of shareholders to the managers’ advantage – the so-called 
race  to  the  bottom  or  “Delaware  effect”).
51  Such  critique,  however,  has  been 
questioned on theoretical as well as empirical grounds.
52 It has been also remarked 
that the very concepts of “top” and “bottom” are not very clear, being based on value 
judgements, and therefore, the race concept is not able to provide univocal policy 
guidance.
53 It is not for granted either that there will in fact be a “race”.
54 
 
What  is  important  for  regulatory  competition  to  work  effectively  are,  in  fact,  its 
assumptions and in particular: 
 
-  a sufficiently large number of divergent legal systems among which to choose;  
-  mobility or, more in general, reactivity on the part of individuals and firms to 
differences in the rules; 
-  reactivity  on  the  part  of  the  law-makers  to  the  choices  made  by  their 
“customers”; 
-  full knowledge of the legal rules adopted in the different systems; 
-  no externality problems. 
 
The  possible  need  of  an  action  that  will  assure  that  such  assumptions  do  occur, 
explains why the “doing nothing” was coupled with the addition “with a plan”. 
 
The  first  assumption  contains  a  clear  policy  indication  against  top-down 
harmonisation pressures: uniform legal systems do not provide alternatives and nullify 
the “discovery” procedure. 
 
                                                 
47 ECJ, 9 March 1999, Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR I-
1459. 
48  ECJ,  5  November  2002,  Case  C-208/00  Überseering  BV  v  Nordic  Construction  Company 
Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), [2002] ECR I-9919. 
49 According to this principle, the legal existence and capacity of a company depends on the law of the 
State in which it is incorporated. What the Court has ruled is that any company, once incorporated in 
one Member State, is free to establish itself and do business in another Member State – even if this 
implies transferring its “real seat” – without having to comply to the host country legislation. 
50 Discussion of this issue can be found, inter alia, in: Heine, K. “Regulatory competition between 
Company Laws in the European Union; the Überseering case”, in Intereconomics 2003, p. 102; E.M. 
Kieninger “The legal framework of Regulatory Competition based on company mobility: EU and US 
compared”, in German Law Journal 2004, vol. 6, p. 742. 
51 L. Bebchuck “Federalism and the corporation: the desirable limits on state competition in corporate 
law”, in 105 Harvard Law Rev. 1992 p. 1443 
52 See D. Vogel and R. A. Kagan “National Regulations in a Global Economy. An Introduction”, 
UCIAS Edited Vol. 1 Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalization Affect National Regulatory 
Policies, 2002; Radaelli, Claudio M. “The Puzzle of Regulatory Competition”, in Journal of Public 
Policy, Volume 24, Issue 01, May 2004, p. 1 
53 See Radaelli, cit. supra at footnote 52 
54 Heine, K. “Regulatory competition between Company Laws” cit. supra at footnote 50; Kahan, M. 
and Kamar, E. (2002), “The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law” in 55 Stanford Law Review 
679-749. DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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The mobility issue, at first glance, might seem problematic, as it might imply very 
high relocation costs. However, for many legal areas individuals do not really need to 
move  in  order  to  express  their  preferences:  for  instance,  in  presence  of  mutual 
recognition, free movement of goods replaces the necessity of relocating; a choice of 
foreign law made by parties to a contract also shows individuals’ preferences without 
actual relocation. 
 
As  it  has  been  effectively  emphasised,  in  many  cases  it  is  a  question  of  private 
international law, i.e. whether legal systems will recognize and enforce the choice of 
law rule elected by the parties to a transaction.
55 
 
Some doubts have been cast as to the reactivity of law-makers to the preferences of 
individuals and firms.
56 However, so far, there seems to be no conclusive evidence in 
one sense or the other.
57 
 
The problem of knowledge of alternative legal rules and of their effects seems to be a 
more  severe  one.  Circulation  of  ideas  between  legal  communities  is  obviously  a 
condition sine qua non. At this juncture, in Europe, such exchanges are still in their 
infancy. While EC law fosters the free movement of ideas (among others), there are 
still vast areas of law (and of the legal community) which remain generally shielded 
from any confrontation with ideas from other legal communities. National legislation 
and judgments of national courts are not disseminated beyond national borders, and 
only  a  small  group  of  academics  actually  looks  across  these  borders.  The  recent 
creation of networks of regulatory authorities such as the ECN/ERG/ERGEG and ICN 
may  be  seen  as  examples  of  institutional  devices  for  boosting  circulation  of 
information among legal systems. 
 
Lastly, the presence of market failures and in particular of externalities can effectively 
prevent the development of a healthy regulatory competition or generate a race to the 
bottom.  Economics  teaches  us  that  in  such  situations,  non-coordinated  actions  of 
individuals (in the present case, of individual Member States) do not lead to the best 
outcome,  the  one  that  maximises  social  (overall)  welfare.  This  can  justify  some 
degree of coordination or some sort of top-down intervention.  
 
In  fact,  it  seems  clear  that  we  are  never  really  faced with  a  binary  choice  –  full 
harmonisation  or  bare  regulatory  competition  –  but  there  is  a  whole  range  of 
possibilities with variable degrees of competition and cooperation.
58 The necessity of 
a certain regulatory harmonisation at the procedural level or at an “institutional meta-
                                                 
55 See F. J. Garcimartín Alférez “Regulatory Competition: a Private International Law Approach”, in 
Eur. Journal of Law and Econ. 1999, p. 251. 
56  Radaelli,  cit  supra  at  footnote  52,  page  7  and  A.  Harcourt  “Institution-driven  competition:  the 
Regulation  of  Cross-Border  Broadcasting  in  the  EU”,  EUI  Working  Papers,  RSCAS  no.  2004/44, 
although one might doubt whether the broadcasting sector is the most representative example. 
57 See, for instance, on reactivity of legislators in the “competition” for incorporations, E.M. Kieninger, 
cit supra at footnote 50, at page 766 et seq.. 
58  In  this  sense,  A.  O.  Sykes,  “Regulatory  Competition  or  Regulatory  Harmonization?  A  silly 
question?” in Journal of International Economic Law 2000, p. 257; Geradin & Esty, cit. supra at 
footnote 42; C.M. Radaelli, cit. supra at footnote 52. DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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level” is generally advocated in order to allow regulatory competition to take place 
and avoid the risk of a race towards the bottom.
59 
 
Actually, the form of “regulatory competition” referred to in this paper is broader than 
just market actors “voting with their feet”. It extends also to a “marketplaces of legal 
ideas” where law is central and members of the legal community are looking for the 
best solution to the issues they are confronted with.  
 
There are at least three dimensions of this “marketplace of ideas” that can work in 
favour of elimination of divergences among legal systems, in the sense advocated by 
this paper. 
 
1.  Free movement of persons and goods, choice of law rules 
2.  Circulation  of  legal  ideas  through  academics  or  through  new 
forms/institutions of cooperation 
3.  Role of the European Court of Justice and principle of proportionality  
 
The first point refers to the classical view of regulatory competition, but takes into 
account the alternatives to actual relocation of economic agents, as referred to above.  
 
The  second  dimension  pushes  regulatory  competition  one  level  up,  by  touching 
directly the problem of circulation of legal ideas not among the economic actors but 
among the legal actors and the regulators. Institutions could maybe be devised for 
such a purpose on the model of what is currently happening in the ECN, ICN or ERG 
settings. 
 
The third point emphasises the role of the European Court of Justice in the circulation 
of  legal  ideas  and  legal  solutions.  The  Court  can  be  seen  in  this  context  as  a 
“coordinator of information”:
60 parties to the proceedings may refer to practices in 
other Member States and the Court itself may evaluate the proportionality of certain 




V.  Conclusion 
 
By taking the consequences of what has been said in the previous sections, we can 
attempt to draw some conclusions. 
 
Bearing in mind that the mere existence of a divergence is not a problem in itself, it is 
worthwhile  noting  that  none  of  the  alternatives  described  above  seems  to  be  the 
panacea for all forms of “problematic” divergences. 
                                                 
59 See, among others, Barnard C. & Deakin S., “Market Access and Regulatory Competition”, Chapter 
8, The Law of the Single European Market, Unpacking the Premises, ed. by Barnard C. & Scott J., Hart 
Pub. 2002; K. Heine, cit. supra at footnote 54; F. Garcimartín, cit. supra at footnote 55. It is sometimes 
also argued that harmonisation is indispensable when diverging terminology exists across legal systems 
(in this sense, R. Van den Bergh cit. supra at footnote 42). However, if we adopt the functionalist 
approach  suggested  above  in  Section  II,  the  purely  terminological  problem  looses  much  of  its 
relevance. 
60 Barnard and Deakin, cit. supra at footnote 59 at p. 223.  DRAFT – Not to be quoted 
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If  the  divergence  problem  is,  in  fact  one  of  externalities,  then,  as  it  has  been 
highlighted, non-coordinated actions might result in failures. In such cases, therefore, 
both explicit and conceptual divergence are probably best cured by an harmonisation 
intervention. Such intervention might affect directly the substance of the problem, by 
providing a uniform rule for all the involved jurisdiction, but it could also take the 
form  of  a  procedural  framework,
61  such  as  establishing  an  appropriate  (uniform) 
private international law rule.
62 
 
If the problem is caused by the presence of transaction costs, the recipe will probably 
not be the same for every case. In some cases, the “do nothing” approach might work 
well, in particular, when the legal area allows it and when multinational firms are 
concerned.  Full  harmonisation  is  generally  prone  to  bring  about  very  high  costs, 
without  being  sure  of  the  overall  result.  Moreover,  in  the  case  of  conceptual 
divergences, it might push the problem deeper, thus reinforcing the costs specific to 
such form of divergence.  
 
A broader version of regulatory competition – extending to the “marketplace of legal 
ideas” – offers a valid alternative to the abovementioned solutions. 
 
Moving back to conceptual divergence in particular, in general, the use of economic 
analysis tends to reduce the sense of urgency which might be felt when conceptual 
divergences are detected. Indeed, by and large, the various economic analysis tools 
used to examine explicit divergences are applicable to conceptual divergences as well. 
As is the case with explicit divergence, they show that divergence can rationally be 
explained, that it does not really occur that often, that it may not always undesirable 
and that removing it can sometimes make the situation worse. 
                                                 
61 Barnard and Deakin in this direction, cit. supra at footnote 59 at p. 220. 
62 In favour of this alternative, F. Garcimartín, cit. supra at footnote 55. 